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Abstract
This article studies how public opinion is associated with the introduction of renewable energy
policies in Europe. While research increasingly seeks to model the link between public opinion and
environmental policies, the empirical evidence is largely based on a single case: the US. This limits the
generalizability of findings and we argue accordingly for a systematic, quantitative study of how public
opinion drives environmental policies in another context. Theoretically, we combine arguments
behind the political survival of democratic leaders with electoral success and environmental politics.
Ultimately, we suggest that office-seeking leaders introduce policies that seem favorable to the
domestic audience; if the public prefers environmental protection, the government introduces such
policies in turn. The main contribution of this research is the cross-country empirical analysis, where
we combine data on the public’s environmental attitudes and renewable energy policy outputs in a
European context between 1974 and 2015. We show that as public opinion shifts towards prioritizing
the environment, there is a significant and positive effect on the rate of renewable energy policy
outputs by governments in Europe. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic, quantitative study
of public opinion and environmental policies across a large set of countries, and we demonstrate that
the mechanisms behind the introduction of renewable energy policies follow major trends across
European states.
Introduction
Despite a 24 percent decrease in the European Union’s
(EU) CO2 energy footprint between 1990 and 2010
4,
more than half of EU countries’ energy is still derived
from fossil fuels. In 2010, EUmember states generated
56 percent of energy from oil, coal, and natural gas,
but only 19 percent from renewable energy sources.
However, the share of renewables is rapidly increas-
ing in Europe in terms of newly added power capacity.
In 2010, renewables accounted for only 40 percent of
new power added to Europe compared to nearly 90
percent in 2016. Moreover, wind power overtook coal
in 2016 to become the second largest power source
added in Europe after natural gas. However, national
4 According to the International Energy Agency, 434 gCO2e kWh
−1
in 1990 and 331 gCO2e kWh
−1 in 2010.
governments largely retain control over energy policy
in the EU5 and, interestingly, there is a considerable
amount of variance across EUmember states in the rate
at which they have added renewable capacity under the
EU 2020 Energy Strategy6. For instance, Latvia grants
tax reductions on diesel and petrol if mixed with bio-
fuels, while no such policy exists in Estonia. Moreover,
targets for renewable energy in each country vary to
reflect their various starting points and their ability to
further increase its use, from a minimum of 10 percent
5 In the words of Delbeke and Vis (2015: 69), ‘[e]ven now under the
Lisbon Treaty, it is explicitly stated that the EU’s energy policy shall
neither affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions
for exploiting its energy resources, nor its choices between different
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.’
6 This policy, coupled with the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive
2009/28/EC, seeks to achieve a 20 percent reduction of carbon emis-
sions, with 20 percent of energy supplied by renewables, and a 20
percent improvement in energy efficiency by the year 2020.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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Note: The data used for this graph are based on the IRENA/IEA data, which are introduced in the 
research design below. 
Figure 1. Total number of domestic energy policies, 2015.
in Malta to 72 percent of total energy use in Iceland.
Figure 1 underlines this by mapping the total number
of energy policies in force in the last year of our sample
period (2015) for all states included in our data set.
Germany, Sweden, or the UKmay be seen as frontrun-
ners for the introduction of renewable energy policies
at the domestic level, while Eastern European states, in
particular, lag behind.
What explains variation in the use of renewables in
Europe around the generally rising trend? Prior work
identifies institutional features such as government
capacity (Cao and Ward 2015, Schaffer and Bernauer
2014), socio-economic factors, e.g. GDP per capita
(Apergis and Payne 2010) and economic growth (Sebri
and Ben-Salha 2014), special interests (Ince et al 2016,
Lyon and Yin 2010) or the diffusion of technologies
(Popp et al 2011, Neij 1997) as key determinants of
countries’ renewable energy policies. More recently,
scholars have begun to concentrate on public opinion
as a crucial explanatory factor, e.g. the electorates’ pro-
environmental beliefs. The following article focuses on
this factor. Despite important insights into how pub-
lic opinion might create demand for environmental
policies, which may then translate into actual pol-
icy implementation, previous research has been overly
US-centric; it is thus at least questionable whether we
can extend existing findings to another context such as
the EU. Europe is distinct from the US in terms of (1) a
supranational governance structure for most countries
(i.e. theEU) and (2) the lack of skepticism regarding cli-
mate change and how environmental quality generally
is valued. Thus, public opinion might play a different
role in the European context than in the US, and the
generalizability of findings from the US could well be
limited.
We argue accordingly for a systematic, cross-
national quantitative study of the relationship between
public opinion and environmental policies in another,
non-US context. We focus on public opinion in estab-
lished democracies as a key determinant of energy
policies that has so far largely been overlooked in
Europe. The main contribution of this research is
empirical. We combine public opinion data on envi-
ronmental attitudes for a large sample of European
countries with data on renewable energy policies since
the 1970s. The final data allow us to quantitatively ana-
lyze the effect of public opinion on the introduction
of national energy policies over a large period of time
and countries, beyond single cases, thereby presenting
robust insights into states’ environmental legislation.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic,
rigorous cross-national analysis of renewable energy
policies and public opinion attitudes that can uncover
major trends across states. We also assess the ability
of our core explanatory variable to predict renewable
energy policies (see Ward et al 2010) and evaluate the
robustness of our main finding by considering alter-
native hypotheses pertaining to media attention and
Internet search-term intensity (‘climate change’) in the
appendix. Our work thus seeks to make a significant
contribution to our understanding of how environ-
mental policies emerge at the national level, and we
believe that it also has key implications for the effec-
tiveness of these policies as their success also tends to
depend on the degree of public support (e.g. Patt and
Weber 2014, Bakaki and Bernauer 2016).
Providing a systematic examination of environ-
mental policy outputs as driven by public opinion
shifts in a non-US context will significantly improve
our understanding of how governments shape their
legislation. Empirically, we use a series of survey
questions measuring environmental opinion from
the Eurobarometer for EU/EC member states in
1974−2015, candidate states from 2001, and states of
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interest (Switzerland,NorwayandIceland).Thedepen-
dent variable, national energy policies in European
countries, was compiled using information from the
IRENA/IEA global renewable energy policies database.
Our results suggest that as public opinion shifts towards
prioritizing the environment as an issue, there is a sig-
nificant and positive effect on the rate of renewable
energy policy outputs by governments in Europe. This
finding has crucial policy implications and contributes
to the academic literature in several ways. First, we
investigate the effect of public opinion on energy policy
beyond the US. By extending the scope of present work
on the relationship between environmental policy out-
puts andpublic opinion,we increase generalizability. In
addition, we contribute to the larger debate on whether
politicians respond to what voters want or if parties
and governments merely push for their own agenda
(see Huber and Powell 1994, Stimson et al 1995, Pow-
ell 2000).Ourworkpresents strongand robust evidence
for the former and that governments react to the pref-
erences of the median voter, which mirrors, e.g. Ezrow
(2010) who focuses on Western Europe and finds par-
ties to be vote-maximizing and center-oriented. Parties
tailor their ideologies to appeal to a broader spectrum
of the electorate, and we provide further evidence for
this in the context of renewable energy policies.
Argument
Webuild upon and contribute to an extensive literature
investigating the effect of democracy on environmental
policies. The first strand in this literature investigates
which institutional features account for differences
in policy outputs. Such institutional features range
from inclusiveness (Bo¨hmelt et al 2016) and govern-
ment resources (Cao and Ward 2015) to the strength
of left parties (Neumayer 2003). According to this
work, democracies are more likely to commit to envi-
ronmental policies than non-democracies (Ba¨ttig and
Bernauer 2009, Neumayer 2002, Fiorino 2011, Schaf-
fer and Bernauer 2014). However, controlling for other
factors, democracies do not emit significantly less car-
bon per-capita (Cao and Ward 2015, Ward 2008). On
theoretical grounds, democracies are only expected to
reduce carbon emissions if there is public support for
this, so the effect of democracy will be mediated by
demand for action. This leads to the second strand,
which explores the demand side, i.e. the effect of pub-
lic opinion on environmental policy. In general, as
public sentiment shifts toward pro-environmentalism,
policymakers sense such a shift and may then legis-
late pro-environmental policies to better reflect public
demand. However, this literature is mainly focused on
the US (see Agnone 2007, Anderson 2011, Weaver
2008). In addition, those studies analyzing a broader
sample cross-nationally tend to conflate environ-
mental performance with policy (see Weaver 2008,
Shum 2009), although performance may lag behind
developments in public policies that take time to have
an effect7.
Prior work finds that the public’s climate beliefs
impact the voting behavior of policymakers and
the passage of pro-environmental policies (Agnone
2007, Anderson 2011, Shum 2009, Weaver 2008).
In the US, senators and representatives vote more
pro-environmentally, the more concerned their con-
stituents are about climate change (Agnone 2007,
Anderson 2011, Johnson et al 2010, Vandeweerdt et al
2016).Globally, countrieswithpro-environmental atti-
tudes tend to have a greater number of environmental-
friendly policies, particularly if the public is willing to
make economic sacrifices for the environment (i.e. pay
higher prices) (Weaver 2008). Likewise, other scholars
identified a lack of public support as a major barrier to
transitioning to a low-carbon economy (Geels 2013,
Wiseman et al 2013). But what are the underlying
mechanisms behind these relationships? We outline
a general and comprehensive mechanism that links
public opinion to environmental policy outputs in
democratic states in three steps. First, all countries
in our sample are democratic, and their leaders can
be assumed to have the primary incentive of retain-
ing power. In pursuit of this goal, second, leaders
seek to introduce policies that favor the domestic
audience. And, third, if the public wants to protect
the environment, the government introduces such
policies so as to maximize its chances of staying in
power. We believe that environmental politics is not an
exception to this.
In detail, first, democratic institutions incentivize
leaders to provide public goods and to respond to
constituents’ needs (e.g. BuenodeMesquita et al2005).
The underlying mechanism for this is that democratic
leaders can be removed more easily from office due
to, e.g. regular elections, and politicians thus have the
incentive to meet their voters’ needs (Dahl 1971). In
addition, democracies have larger winning coalitions
(i.e. thosewho control enoughpower to keep a leader in
office), and the relative cost of providing private goods
to these individuals as a means of maintaining power
is therefore higher than in autocracies. Instead, demo-
cratic leaders provide public goods to retain power. But
how do democratic politicians provide public goods in
line with voters’ preferences?
Democracies provide the opportunity for citizens
to influence politics. Citizens can do so via multiple
channels including interest groups, themedia, demon-
strations, and, as indicated above, voting in elections
(Cao and Ward 2015, Congleton 1992). Subsequently,
7 More specifically, Weaver (2008), analyzing cross-sectional data
for 64 states, finds that people’s willingness to pay more for envi-
ronmental quality is positively associated with measures from the
2005 Environmental Sustainability Index. And Shum (2009) focuses
on the 2008 Environmental Performance Index and finds some evi-
dence that public opinion can explain the divergences and outcomes
observed in environmental quality.
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politicians will supply public goods in line with the
median voter’s attitude (Downs 1957). Since politicians
are concerned about votes and can choose their posi-
tions accordingly to maximize their chances to win the
next election, they will adopt policy platforms that are
closer to the ideal policies of the median voter. This, in
turn, should lead to a greater provision of public goods
desired by themedian voter. And, in fact, environmen-
tal quality, or implementing less emission-intensive
energy policies and mitigating climate change as in our
context, is a public good. This mechanism mirrors,
in principle, Shum (2009: 282) who tests ‘[whether],
where voters and citizens express a favorable opinion
of increased environmental regulation, governments
will enact more stringent policies for ensuring environ-
mental quality’ (see also Congleton 1992).
However, the literature suggests that policy output
is unlikely to be continuously responsive to the level of
public support for action. Rather, policy output tends
to shift in a discontinuous manner (Baumgartner and
Jones 1993, Jones 1994, Jones and Baumgartner 2005,
True et al 2007), responding to shifts in the level of
support (Wlezien 1995). Most of the time in an issue
area, policy change is incremental, as attention is not
focusedon that area at themacro level, andacoalitionof
interests has accreted at policy sub-system level (Mazey
and Richardson 2006). However, issues occasionally
break out into the macro-political realm where elected
politicians operate andwheremajor policy shifts occur.
Because of bounded rationality, politicians can only
process issues sequentially (Walgrave and Dejaeghere
2016), and to break through their attention thresholds
requires a positive feedback process whereby pressure
for change builds. Policy entrepreneurs, themedia, and
public opinion positively feed-back off each other until
punctuation in policy occurs. Broad public support for
policy change, signaled by a major shift in public opin-
ion, is not necessary for an agenda breakthrough, but it
addsweight to other forces atwork pushing against pol-
icy inertia (Jones and Baumgartner 2012). Thus, shifts
in public opinion should increase the chances of non-
incremental change, although the links between it and
public policy change are complex and discontinuous.
Punctuated equilibrium theory has now been widely
applied (see True et al 2007), and has found applica-
tion to US environmental policy (Baumgartner 2006).
Given the complexity of policy-making and the rangeof
competing theories, it is not surprising that it has been
subject to quite extensive criticism, because to some
extent it ignores the impact of broader social, economic,
and political processes (e.g. John 2012, 163−165; Flink
2015). Nevertheless, we argue that it is useful for think-
ing about the passage of renewable energy policies in
Europe and test the following empirical implication:
the larger the shift in public support for environmental
action, the more likely it is that new policies will emerge
and the greater the number of new policy instruments
can be expected to be introduced.
Research design
To examine the effect of shifts in public opinion on
governments’ responsiveness and, hence, policy out-
put in a cross-national context, we compiled data on
the core variables of interest for a sample of estab-
lished European democracies since the 1970s. The
country-year is the unit of analysis in this time-series
cross-sectional data set, and the appendix gives a
detailed overview of states and years included in this
sample. The cases in our analysis are predetermined
by data availability for our dependent variable, which
we compiled using information from the IRENA/IEA
global renewable energy policies database, and our core
explanatory variable from the Eurobarometer.8
Our outcome variable focuses on policy outputs
that could improve environmental quality. One of the
most significant environmental problems of our time is
climate change, and climate change is strongly related
to countries’ energy policies (e.g. Pfeiffer and Mulder
2013, Schaffer and Bernauer 2014). Moreover, a key
step to limiting the effects of climate change and transi-
tioning to a low-carbon society is the de-carbonization
of the energy sector (OECD/IEA/NEA/ITF 2015).
Accordingly, we employ a measure of states’ renew-
able energy policies. We compiled data from the joint
IRENA/IEAglobal renewable energy policies andmea-
suresdatabase9.Weconcentrate specifically onnational
policies belonging to the following categories: eco-
nomic instruments, information and education, policy
support, regulatory instruments, research and devel-
opment, and voluntary approaches. The date each
policy came into force and ended is provided by the
IRENA/IEA database, and we used this information
to code a variable counting the number of renewable
energy policies a state has introduced in each year over
our sample period (see also Johnstone et al2010: 141ff).
As Cao and Ward (2017: 89f) emphasize, this mea-
sure ‘is more closely related to climate change [than
general measures of the stringency of environmental
policy], although it does not directly capture carbon
taxes (Ward and Cao 2012) and energy conservation
8 Analternativehypothesismight state that policy change is drivenby
attention. This could be measured through media coverage (Newig
2004, Schmidt et al 2013) or internet search-term intensity (Qin and
Peng 2016). As an anonymous reviewer suggested, attention changes
farmorequickly thanopinionand, therefore, couldbea strongpoten-
tial predictor of policy change (Newig 2004). The appendix presents
some relevant analysis. Specifically, we have compiled search-term
intensity data from Google Trends using the term ‘climate change’
(see also Qin and Peng 2016) and extrapolated the media data from
Schmidt et al (2013). In turn, we re-estimated our main model while
including the two new items in addition. As shown in the appendix,
the Google Trends variable is positively signed and statistically sig-
nificant, while the media item is positively signed as well, but fails
to achieve a conventional level of significance. Most importantly,
though, ourmain variable remains robust to this change in themodel
specification.
9 Available online at: www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/renewable
energy/.
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Note: The data used for this graph are based on the Eurobarometer. Opinion data in this figure are 
averaged across all years in our sample. 
Figure 2. Countries’ average change in environmental public policy mood, 1974−2015.
policy.’ We have observations for 735 country-years,
with a mean value of 0.867 new policies introduced per
year (standard deviation of 0.132).
For simplicity andeaseof interpretation,weemploy
OLS regression models in our main estimations, but
we also present count models (negative binomial and
Poisson regression models) that take the underly-
ing (count) data-generating process of our outcome
variable more directly into account. We include coun-
try fixed effects alongside the substantive predictors
to capture any time-invariant unit-level forms of
cross-section heterogeneity; and we include a tempo-
rally lagged dependent variable, which controls for a
state’s introduction of national policies in the previ-
ous year. Thus, we allow for the potential influence
of countries’ past behavior on their current policy
implementation10. We also address temporal auto-
correlation more generally with cubic polynomials on
the time elapsed (in years) since the last introduction
of at least one domestic renewable-energy instrument
(Carter and Signorino 2010).
The core explanatory variable of our analysis is
based on the Eurobarometer survey11. The EU Com-
mission has conducted such surveys in EC/EUmember
states since1974, candidate states asof 2001, and several
other countries of interest (e.g. Switzerland, Norway,
Iceland) in various years. Unfortunately, the Euro-
barometer does not ask the same question(s) in every
survey, and even if the intention behind a question
is the same, formulations may be different. With a
view to capturing our theoretical concept as closely as
10 Given the structure of the data, serially correlated errors within
countriesmightbepossible; the temporally laggeddependentvariable
addresses this (Beck 2001).
11 Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_
en.htm.
possible while maximizing country-year coverage, we
ultimately opted for a combination of two Eurobarom-
eter survey items. First, there is the question, which
asks whether respondents think that fighting pollution
is (4) not at all important, (3) of little importance, (2)
important, and (1) very important. The item has not
been included in all Eurobarometer surveys, however.
In fact, second, it seems that this question has been
replaced by another ordinally scaled question in some,
and particularly in more recent, surveys: ‘please tell
me, for the problem of protecting nature and fighting
pollution, whether you personally consider it a very
important problem (1), important (2), of little impor-
tance (3), or not at all important (4).’ We combined
these two survey questions as follows: we first dropped
the ‘don’t know’ answers and missing values. After-
wards,wemergedboth variables as they follow the same
scale, and inverted this so that higher values pertain to
a more favorable attitude towards fighting pollution
and protecting the environment. Third, we aggregated
this individual-level information to the country level by
averaging across respondents. We thus end up with a
variable measuring the public mood towards protect-
ing nature and fighting pollution, which theoretically
ranges in [1; 4] and with higher values indicating that
a larger share of respondents perceives environmen-
tal protection as more important. Finally, we created
a first-difference measure by subtracting the variable’s
values in t-1 from current values. Our final item thus
captures shifts in public opinion, with a mean value of
−0.001 (standard deviation of 0.468). Figure 2 maps
public opinion on environmental protection for all
states included in our analysis averaged across the
years for which data are available. In combination with
figure 1, note that this graph lends some initial support
toour theoretical expectations asmost countries associ-
ated with a shift towards more environmental-friendly
5
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Table 1. Public opinion and the energy policy outputs.
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) Negative binomial
Energy policies
𝑡−1 0.213
∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.137 0.064
(0.079) (0.055) (0.084) (0.044)
Public opinion change 0.303∗∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.284∗∗
(0.134) (0.131) (0.117)
Civil society participation
𝑡−1 –2.856 –4.920
∗ –3.501
(2.398) (2.891) (2.672)
Democracy
𝑡−1 0.236 0.515
∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.220) (0.245)
Economic globalization
𝑡−1 0.040
∗∗∗ 0.016 0.019
(0.010) (0.015) (0.022)
Energy use
𝑡−1 (ln) 0.129 0.209 1.968
∗
(0.614) (0.589) (1.083)
Population
𝑡−1 (ln) 1.599 0.040 –0.148
(2.639) (3.543) (0.560)
GDP per capita
𝑡−1 (ln) 0.247 0.675
∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.252) (0.271)
Constant 1.202∗∗∗ –31.352 –9.558 –26.958∗∗∗
(0.146) (41.108) (54.825) (9.870)
Obs. 367 546 338 327
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Temporal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.279 0.077 0.242 0.070
AIC 1149.714 1704.465 1036.531 662.656
Note: Obs. =number of observations;R2 = (pseudo) coefficient of determination; AIC=Akaike information criterion; standard errors clustered
on country in parentheses.
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
policy moods (positive trend) are, in fact, associated
with a larger number of energy policies active in 201512 .
We also include a series of control variables, which
may affect our dependent variable to avoid omitted
variable bias. We primarily followed earlier (quantita-
tive) studies that have a similar focus to our work (e.g.
Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013, Schaffer and Bernauer 2014,
Cao andWard 2017), and eventually identified six con-
trols that seem exogenous to our dependent variable,
that control for alternativemechanisms influencing the
introduction of energy policy, and that may well be
correlated with the core predictor. These controls are
described in the appendix.
Findings
Table 1 summarizes the four main models that we esti-
mate. Thefirst only includes the core variable of interest
alongside the lagged dependent variable, country fixed
effects, and the temporal controls. Model 2 only com-
prises the control variables and the country fixed effects
as well as the lagged dependent variable and tempo-
12 Ourmain explanatory variable thus focuses on pollution and envi-
ronmental issues more generally. This is driven by the fact that the
Eurobarometer time series do not consistently cover climate change
as such; environmental quality and pollution have a much broader
coverage over the years. For the outcome variable, in turn, we do
need a cross-country comparable indicator of policy outputs that
are favorable to the environment—and renewable energy policies
meet this criterion. The assumption we make in this regard is that
more favorable attitudes towards the environment and environmen-
tal quality should not only be positively related to any policy that
(potentially) improves the environment, but also renewable energies
that more specifically address climate change.
ral controls. Model 3 constitutes our full model that
incorporates all explanatory variables as well as coun-
try fixed effects, the lagged dependent variable, and
the temporal controls. Model 4 is identical to Model
3, but it relies on a fixed-effects negative binomial
regression model specification that takes the underly-
ing (count) data-generating process more directly into
account than ordinary least squares.
The table entries pertaining toOLS regression coef-
ficients (Models 1−3) can be interpreted directly as
marginal effects. With regard to our hypothesis, Pub-
lic Opinion Change is positively signed and statistically
significant at conventional levels in all OLS estima-
tions and in the negative binomial regression (Model
4). Adding or dropping variables does not change this
finding, and a series of additional specifications in
the appendix further demonstrates how robust this
result is. In substantive terms, when increasing Pub-
lic Opinion Change by one unit, i.e. when the public
has become more favorable of environmental protec-
tion over the last year, the predicted number of energy
policies introduced in the current year increases by
0.303–0.353 (Models 1 and 3, respectively). Similarly,
both in termsof significanceand substance, thenegative
binomial specification suggests a predicted increase of
1.33 policieswhenPublicOpinionChange is raised by 1.
Figure 3 plots the change in the predicted number of
policieswhen changingPublicOpinionChange from its
minimum to itsmaximum (based onModel 3): the lin-
ear predictionofEnergy Policies is 1.56 at themaximum
of our core explanatory variable, while it decreases to
0.79 when Public Opinion Change is at its minimum.
The difference between both point estimates is statis-
tically significant as the confidence intervals do not
6
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Note: Graph displays point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals (horizontal bars) for first  
differences. A first difference is the change in the linear prediction of the outcome variable associated 
with a change from the minimum to the maximum value of Public Opinion Change  while holding all  
other covariates constant at their means.
Figure 3. Public Opinion Change—First Difference.
overlap. In the appendix, we plot the simulated coef-
ficient estimate of Public Opinion Change using the
approach suggested in King et al (2000). As the coeffi-
cient is a simulated parameter, we present a density plot
that captures its distribution. The graph demonstrates
that the simulation does not call into question our con-
clusion about the statistical significance of the variable,
emphasizing that the public opinion on environmental
protection in a country directly affects governmental
policies in turn. In other words, there is strong and
robust support for our hypothesis.
For illustrating that our core variable of interest
not only has explanatory power according to statisti-
cal significance, but also predictive power, we provide
three goodness-of-fit measures for prediction accu-
racy in an in-sample setup, i.e. how accurate are the
‘conditional statements about aphenomenon forwhich
the researcher actually has data, i.e. the outcome vari-
able has been observed’ (Bechtel and Leuffen 2010: 311;
see also Ward et al 2010)? First, Theil (1966) U is the
square root of the ratio between the sum of squared
prediction errors of the baseline model (i.e. Model 3)
and the sum of squared prediction errors of a naı¨ve
model, i.e. a ‘no-change prediction’ where the num-
ber of policies introduced in in t-1 fully corresponds
to number of policies in t. If Theil’s U is larger than
1, the model performs worse than the naı¨ve model;
values of Theil’s U smaller than 1 indicate that the
‘theoretically informed model’ performs better than
the naı¨ve specification. Second, the mean squared pre-
diction error (MSPE) pertains to the expected value
of the squared difference between the observed val-
ues of the outcome variable and the predicted ones.
Third, the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)
Table 2. Predictive power.
Theil’s U MSPE MAPE
Model 3 (Full Model) 0.852 1.178 0.445
Model 3 w out−1 Public opinion change 1.308 1.280 0.463
is defined by the average of the unsigned percentage
error, i.e. it is the expected value of the absolute dif-
ference between the observed values of the outcome
variable and the predicted values divided by the actu-
ally observed values. The closer the value of any of the
last two statistics is to 0, the more accurate is the model
in making predictions. However, the MSPE is scale-
dependent,while theMAPE isnot. In termsof the latter,
less than 10 percent of error constitute a highly accu-
rate prediction, 10–20 percent stand for a good one,
and 20–50 percent may still be a reasonable prediction.
More than 50 percent of error according to the MAPE
are inaccurate.
We calculated all three measures for two scenarios
(table 2): the first one is identical to Model 3 above,
the second is like Model 3 but omits Public Opinion
Change. In the first scenario, Theil’s U is 0.852, the
MSPE is 1.178, and we obtain a MAPE of 0.445; in the
second scenario, Theil’s U stands at 1.308, the MSPE is
1.280, and theMAPEhasavalueof0.463.Thus,first, the
predictive power of our core variable of interest is estab-
lished as the prediction error increases according to all
three measures when omitting Public Opinion Change.
Second, in general, the predictive power of ourmodel is
reasonably strong as theprediction error is at around44
percent, but it increases by around 2 percentage points
when omitting Public Opinion Change.
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In terms of the control variables, the poor per-
formance of most of them can be explained by the
inclusion of fixed effects, while estimating a sample
over a relatively short time period. Fixed effects models
lack the ability tomake inferences about time-invariant
or slow-moving variables, because those covariates are
highly collinear with fixed effects and their coefficients
are either not identifiedor difficult to estimatewithpre-
cision (Plu¨mper and Troeger 2007). The only robust
control variable is Democracy
𝑡−1 that exerts a signif-
icant and positive impact on the number of energy
policies introduced in each year in most of the mod-
els. As expected, a more democratic system is strongly
associated with more environmental-policy output. In
Model 3, for example, when raising Democracy
𝑡−1 by
one unit, the predicted number of policies increases by
about 0.53 in the next year.
Finally, it seemsworthdiscussing thenegative effect
of Civil Society Participation
𝑡−1 in Model 3. The ratio-
nale behind including this variable as a control, as
further discussed in the appendix, is that more inclu-
sive systems, i.e. societies with a more robust civil
society, should produce more policies in response to
environmental threats and should have better environ-
mental outcomes (Bo¨hmelt et al 2016, see also von
Stein 2017). This, however, neglects the larger debate
on the effects of civil-society participation on environ-
mental policy (e.g. Koontz and Thomas 2006, Young
et al 2013, Newig et al 2017), which shows that a neg-
ative effect of civil society groups on environmental
policymaking may not be entirely unexpected. On one
hand, greater inclusiveness not only leads to enhanced
participation of green civil society, but also of other
interest groups such as coal and oil lobbies. The vari-
able we employ comprises groups that may or may not
have environmental-friendly ambitions. On the other
hand, indeed, Bernauer et al (2013) contend that the
effect of environmental civil-society groups on interna-
tional environmental policy outputs may differ across
democracies and non-democracies: paradoxically, the
marginal influence (effect) of green civil society could
benegative indemocracies as thesekindsof regimeusu-
ally implement more environmental-friendly policies
anyway. And our sample of European states exclusively
comprises democratic countries.
Conclusion
This article is one of the first to present a systematic,
cross-national study of the relationship between pub-
lic opinion and environmental policies as measured by
the implementation of renewable energies in a non-
US context. We found that shifts in public opinion
in the direction of pro-environmentalism significantly
and substantively increase the adoption of renewable
energypolicies inEuropebetween1974and2015.Thus,
public opinion is not only relevant to the passage of
renewable energy policies in theUS, but also in Europe.
This is not to say that shifts in public opinion are the
only relevant factor for renewable energy policy, but
that it can be a key catalyst. The main contribution of
our work lies in the empirical analysis that sought to
regress renewable energy policy data on environmen-
tal attitudes, while assessing the predictive power of
our core explanatory item and comprehensively assess-
ing the robustness of the main result with a series of
additional analyses as summarized in the appendix.
Ultimately, this article sheds new light on the processes
behind the emergence of domestic-level environmen-
tal policies and it may have critical consequences the
success of those policies, since public support is usu-
ally a key driver here as well (see Patt and Weber 2014,
Bakaki and Bernauer 2016).
Future research should investigate what causes
these shifts in public opinion. Many studies ana-
lyze the factors affecting environmental beliefs using
individual-levelpredictors.Themost consistentpredic-
tor is political orientation (Drews and Van den Bergh
2016), but other studies observe significant correlations
between climate change beliefs and knowledge, educa-
tion, gender, as well as age (Nisbet and Myers 2007,
Rosa and Dunlap 1994, Bakaki and Bernauer 2016).
However, it is still unclear what causes these shifts in
public opinion, which we observed in the Eurobarom-
eter surveys. If environmental groups understood
this dynamic, public opinion could be (purposefully)
shifted as a means to catalyze the passage of renewable
energy policy at the federal level.
Moreover, we treated different types of renewable
energy policies similarly, and simply counted the num-
ber of policies in aggregate. An interesting next step
could be to differentiate policies and see whether shifts
inpublicopinion lead toaparticular setofpoliciesbeing
implemented, and what the implications of adopting
a restricted set of policies are in terms of effective-
ness (i.e. environmental performance). Finally, given
the increasing importance of mitigating and adapting
to climate change, our work clearly shows that pub-
lic opinion sets the constraints in which policy can
develop. Therefore, citizen support is a necessary pre-
requisite for the passage of renewable energy policies.
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